The Mechanistic Roots of Occasionalism: Stage One
What is Occasionalism?
Occasionalism is the doctrine about causal efficacy that exploits the nonobservational nature of causation. We observe a prior and a posterior
state of the universe, and discern the difference between them. But we
cannot observe the force or power causally necessitating the change.
Occasionalists argue:
That there is some force causally necessitating such changes;
That this force cannot be the in the physical objects themselves.
Therefore the causal force must be God.
God is the only true efficient cause, in other words. What is interesting is
the justification of the second premise.

The Passivity Arg.

Assessment of PA

Occasionalists offered a number of
arguments for premise two. The first
we considered was The Passivity
Argument.
1. All bodily change is a change in
motion.
2. Bodies cannot initiate motion in
themselves.
3. Bodies cannot initiate motion in
others.
4. Therefore, bodies are completely
passive.
5. Nothing passive can be a cause.
6. Therefore, bodies cannot be
causes.

This argument appears to be
mechanistic by resting on the thesis
that matter, as mere quantity, is
inherently passive. But in fact
passivity in the sense of being unable
to initiate motion in other bodies is
not part of the mechanistic program.
The passivity argument was a poor
argument for occasionalism and one
that betrays no important
mechanistic roots.

The Quod Nescis
Arg.

Assessment of QN

On the surface this argument looks
odd and problematic.
1. Causes must know how to produce
their effects.
2. Bodies cannot be knowers.
3. Therefore bodies cannot be causes.
4. Finite minds do not know how their
volitions produce effects in either
their own bodies or their minds.
5. Therefore, finite minds cannot be
causes.

The Conservation
as Constant
Creation Arg.
Most commentators consider this
the strongest occasionalist
argument.
1. God must conserve physical
objects in existence.
2. Conserving something in
existence is no different from
constantly recreating it at every
moment.
3. Nothing can be created unless it
is created fully determinate.
4. Therefore, nothing can be
created with a power to cause itself
to come to have some property.
5. If nothing can be a cause of
anything in itself, it cannot be a
cause of anything outside of itself
either.
6. Therefore, no finite created thing
can be a cause.

This argument rests on the
implausible assumption that causes
must be agent-like. However, the
argument might possess a degree of
plausibility if one pushes the
mechanistic conception of scientific
explanation as knowing how to do
or make something. Because one
does not truly understand unless
one can recreate the natural
mechanism underlying the causal
event, and because recreating it is
simply doing it, one cannot
understand it unless one is a cause.
But more is still required for the
occasionalist to establish the
converse.

Assessment of
CCC
We question the usual
understanding of this argument
as resting on the premise that
nothing can be created unless it
is fully determinate. A better
interpretation of this argument
is that it relies on two
mechanistic principles. First,
that all bodily properties are
reducible to relations of
extension. And second, that
causes must be simultaneous
with their effects. Such a
reinterpretation of this
argument makes it more
plausible to a theorist who
accepts the necessity of divine
conservation, and shows the
argument's mechanistic roots
much more clearly.

The Project
Occasionalism was first developed by Al-Ghazali in eleventh century
Bagdad. Al-Ghazali’s position and arguments were universally rejected for
over 500 years. Then suddenly in the 1660s, occasionalism reappeared
among the Cartesian mechanists. It would flourish among them for almost
50 years until Newtonianism and Leibnizianism replaced Cartesianism. We
are asking three questions:
What was it about Cartesian strict mechanism that made precipitated
this sudden rise in occasionalism’s fortunes?
How did this make premise two in the occasionalist argument
compelling?
Why didn’t this emerge in Newtonian and Leibnizian mechanical
philosophy?

The No Transfers
Arg.
A much better argument is the No
Transfers Argument.
1. Motion is a mode of a body.
2. Modes cannot be transferred to
other subjects.
3. Therefore, bodies cannot initiate
motion by transferring their own
motion to other bodies.
4. If bodies are to initiate motion in
others, they must create that motion
in those bodies.
5. This is a creation ex nihilo.
6. This is clearly absurd.
7. Therefore, bodies cannot be
causes.

The No Necessary
Connection Arg.
This prominent argument depends
on the claim that causes must be
necessarily connected to their
effects.
1. Causes must be necessarily
connected to their effects.
2. It is always possible to conceive of
a bodily cause occurring without its
alleged effect.
3. Therefore, bodies cannot be
causes.
4. It is always possible to conceive of
a finite mind's volition occurring
without its alleged effect.
5. Therefore, finite minds cannot be
causes.
6. Therefore, physical objects cannot
be causes.

Assessment of NT
This argument gives a proper
metaphysical basis for attributing
passivity in the strong sense to bodies.
And the modal metaphysics was a key
feature of Cartesian mechanical
philosophy. In our judgment, this is a
key element in the rise of
occasionalism and explaining why
occasionalists found premise two
compelling. Contrasting the notion of
property dependence within a modal
metaphysics and the metaphysics of
Newtonianism and Leibnizianism will
be a central task of stage two of our
project.

Assessment of NNC
This is a famous argument because
of its connection with Humean
causal skepticism. But we can find
little reason for a mechanist to
endorse its central premise. Few
natural philosophers committed to
the stronger claim that causes must
be logically necessary for their
effects; they only committed to
causes being causally necessary.
And there is nothing behind the
mechanical philosophy that seems to
require anything more than this.

Conclusion
Of the five arguments occasionalists typically offered for premise two, only NT
and CCC seem to hold any genuine plausibility. And these two arguments
appear to have deep conceptual roots in the new mechanical philosophy of the
seventeenth century. NT is importantly dependent on Descartes' conception
of bodily properties as modes and the notion of existential dependence that is
bound up with that. CCC is importantly dependent on the reduction of all
bodily properties to extension and the premise that causes must be
simultaneous with their effects. This study of the occasionalists' arguments
suggests two preliminary results: (1) that body-body occasionalism, rather than
body-mind or full blown occasionalism, are the most plausible forms of
occasionalism and (2) that crucial factors behind explaining why Newtonian
and Leibnizian physics failed to go in a occasionalist direction was their
rejection of the metaphysics of modes and their rejection of causal
simultaneity. Exploring these preliminary results is the purpose of stage two of
our research program.
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